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A DILEMMA FOR BANKS: DISCLOSURE OF
CUSTOMER RECORDS IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
James A. Peden, Jr.*
From time to time almost every adult citizen must face the
unpleasant necessity of obtaining a loan from a bank, savings and
loan association, credit union, or other financial institution. More-
over, if a person is to participate in the economic life of modern
society, it is virtually a prerequisite that he have and use a bank
checking account. Making application for a loan and utilizing a
checking account are activities which generate written
records-records that can reveal the most personal details about a
bank customer.
If one has access to a customer's loan application, he can ob-
tain detailed knowledge of that customer's income, assets, and lia-
bilities. He can also learn much about the customer's personal or
business plans. If one can secure copies of the checks drawn on a
customer's checking account, he can readily discover the amount
of a customer's monthly mortgage payment, the sums which the
customer spends on utilities and groceries, the total the customer
spends on medical care and the identity of physicians or hospitals
providing that care, the name of insurance companies to whom the
customer pays premiums, the titles of magazines to which the cus-
tomer subscribes, the identity of charities to which the customer
contributes, the names of the church or other organizations in
which the customer holds membership, and the names of political
parties or candidates to whom the customer has made financial
contributions. Dozens of other facts about a bank customer and
* B.A. summa cum laude, J.D., University of Mississippi; Fulbright Scholar, Univer-
sity of Bristol, England; Partner, Stennett, Wilkinson & Ward, Jackson, Mississippi.
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the manner in which he lives can be ascertained from an examina-
tion of his cancelled checks.
The Supreme Court of California has emphasized that a
bank depositor, by using a checking account, "reveals many as-
pects of his personal affairs, opinions, habits, and associations. In-
deed, the totality of bank records provides a virtual current biog-
raphy." 1 Justice Douglas has similarly commented:
The records of checks . . . are highly useful. In a sense a person is
defined by the checks he writes. By examining them the agents get
to know his doctors, lawyers, creditors, political allies, social connec-
tions, religious affiliation, educational interests, the papers and
magazines he reads, and so on ad infinitum.2
Customers understandably expect banks to hold their loan
applications, cancelled checks, account statements, and other bank
records in strict confidence. Banks wish to maintain the goodwill
of their customers, and as a rule banks are careful not to disclose
customer records to third parties. However, it is not uncommon
for the Internal Revenue Service or for another agency of the fed-
eral or state government to seek the banking records of a cus-
tomer. Federal and state grand juries may issue a subpoena duces
tecum for bank records. In a civil proceeding between X and Y,
one party may invoke discovery procedures to obtain the bank
records of the other. Or, in a civil proceeding between X and Y,
one party may have a subpoena duces tecum issued to obtain the
bank records of Z, with whom the opposite party has some per-
sonal or business relationship. It is not unknown for a district at-
torney or a police officer to make a formal request or demand that
a bank produce records of a customer under investigation.
How does a bank respond in such situations? What are its
duties and responsibilities? Does it automatically honor every sub-
poena duces tecum served upon it for customer records? Does the
source of the subpoena duces tecum affect the manner of the
bank's response? Should the bank inform the customer that his
records have been subpoenaed or are otherwise being sought?
What if the bank so informs the customer and the customer then
1. Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 246, 529 P.2d 590, 596, 118 Cal.Rptr.
166, 172 (1974).
2. California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); see also Mortimer, The IRS Summons and the Duty of Confidentiality: A Hobson's
Choice for Bankers-Revisited, 92 BANKING L.J. 832 (1975); Note, Bank Recordkeeping
and the Customer's Expectation of Confidentiality, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 89 (1976).
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demands that the bank still keep his records confidential? What if
a United States marshal or a local sheriff serving a grand jury
subpoena duces tecum on a bank tells bank officers not to reveal
to the customer that his bank records are being sought? Does a
bank ever incur liability to a customer for producing his bank
records in response to a subpoena duces tecum? Does a bank ever
incur liability for honoring a subpoena duces tecum for customer
records if it does not inform the customer? What about the ex-
pense of, search for, and reproduction of bank records? Must the
bank absorb this expense, or can the bank require the subpoenaing
party to pay this expense?
As the foregoing questions suggest, maintaining the confiden-
tiality of customer records while at the same time responding to a
subpoena duces tecum or other lawful process can create a di-
lemma for banks. It is the purpose of this article to analyze that
dilemma and to suggest some practical ways in which a bank, par-
ticularly one subject to Mississippi law, can steer a safe course
between a modern-day Scylla and a contemporary Charybdis.'
I. CONFIDENTIAL BUT NOT PRIVILEGED
There seems to be no doubt that a customer's bank records
are confidential. It is implicit in the bank-customer relationship
that the bank, without the consent of the customer, will not dis-
close to a third party the information contained in the customer's
records." One text-writer has referred to "the existence of a duty
of a rather high order on the part of the bank not to disclose the
intimate details of its depositors' accounts."5 The author of a legal
encyclopedia has said:
While a depositor has no proprietary interest in the records of the
bank, and cannot prevent their publication in a proper case, he does
have a property right in the information contained therein relative to
the state of his account sufficient to place the bank under an implied
duty to keep such records secret as a general rule.'
The first modern statement of confidentiality of bank records
3. For a description of the efforts by classical heroes to steer between the rock of
Scylla and the whirlpool of Charybdis, see HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, book XII; VIRGIL, THE
AENEID, book III.
4. Pigg v. Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Sparks v. Union
Trust Co. of Shelby, 256 N.C. 478, 481, 124 S.E.2d 365, 367 (1962).
5. Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 900, 901 (1963).
6. 9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking § 271c, at 555 (1938).
19831
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
was made in the leading English case, Tournier v. National Pro-
vincial & Union Bank of England,7 in which Lord Justice Scrut-
ton declared in a concurring opinion: "I have no doubt that it is
an implied term of a banker's contract with his customer that the
banker shall not disclose the account, or transactions relating
thereto, of his customer except in certain circumstances." 8
In the principal opinion in Tournier, Lord Justice Burkes
specified the circumstances in which the rule of confidentiality
would yield and in which disclosure of customer records would be
allowed. First, disclosure is permitted where it is required by com-
pulsion of law-for example, in response to a subpoena duces te-
cum. Second, disclosure is permitted where a bank has a public
duty to disclose-for example, making information available to
bank examiners. Third, disclosure is permitted where the interests
of the bank require disclosure-for example, when a bank is in
litigation with a customer, and his records must be disclosed if the
bank is to protect its legal position. Fourth, records may be dis-
closed where the customer has given his express or implied con-
sent to the disclosure-for example, by giving the bank as a busi-
ness reference.9
Thus, the bank's duty of confidentiality to its customers is not
absolute. While bank records may be generally considered confi-
dential, they are not privileged from disclosure. The law does not
recognize a bank-customer privilege akin to the spousal privi-
lege,10 the physician-patient privilege,"1 the priest-penitent privi-
lege,1 2 or the attorney-client privilege.13
American courts, while acknowledging the implicit duty of
banks to keep confidential the financial transactions of their cus-
tomers, have stated that the duty does not apply where a court
compels disclosure. Indeed, the confidential information contained
in the bank records of customers "has always been subject to com-
pulsory disclosure pursuant to a duly issued court summons where
the information was relevant to a controversy being litigated."1"
More than fifty years ago, a New Jersey court, in a case in-
7. [1924] 1 K.B. 461 (C.A.).
8. Id. at 480.
9. Id. at 473.
10. MIss. CODE ANN. §13-1-5 (Supp. 1983).
11. Id. § 13-1-21.
12. Id. § 13-1-22.
13. Id. § 73-3-37(4) (1972).
14. LeValley and Lancy, The IRS Summons and the Duty of Confidentiality: A
Hobson's Choice for Bankers. 89 BANKING L.J. 979, 979-80 (1972).
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volving an effort by a prosecutor to obtain from a bank the
records of accounts, deposits, and withdrawals of certain custom-
ers, said: "There is an implied obligation .. on the bank to keep
these from scrutiny unless compelled by a court of competent ju-
risdiction to do otherwise."' 5 The Supreme Court of Idaho has
agreed that bank records may be produced in circumstances "au-
thorized by law,"' 6 and the Florida District Court of Appeal has
declared:
'Indeed, it is an implied term of the contract between a banker and
his customer that the banker will not divulge to third persons, with-
out the consent of the customer, express or implied, either the state
of the customer's account or any of his transactions with the bank,
or any information relating to the customer acquired through the
keeping of his account, unless the banker is compelled to do so by
order of a court .... 11
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals has similarly imposed
upon banks a duty to keep customer records confidential "absent
compulsion by law." 18
In Mississippi, a somewhat poorly written statute indicates
that customer information held by banks is not to be disclosed
other than in legal proceedings:
In no instance shall the name of any depositor, or the amount of his
deposit, be disclosed to anyone, except when required to be done in
legal proceedings or in case of insolvency of banks, and any violation
of this provision shall be considered a misdemeanor, and, upon con-
viction thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction, such persons
shall be punished by fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or
imprisoned in the county jail not more than six months, or both, and
in addition thereto, shall be liable upon his bond to any person dam-
aged thereby.'
This statute, which was enacted in 1934,20 has never been
amended. Nor has it ever been interpreted by the Supreme Court
15. Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 390, 146 A. 34, 36 (N.J. Ch. 1929).
16. Peterson v. Idaho First National Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 588, 367 P.2d 284, 290
(1961).
17. Milohnich v. First National Bank of Miami Springs, 224 So. 2d 759, 761 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (quoting 10 AM. JUR. 2D, Banks § 332, at 295 (1963)) (emphasis
added by the court).
18. Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 44 Md. App. 335, 344, 408 A.2d 758, 764
(1979).
19. Miss. CODE ANN. § 81-5-55 (1972).
20. 1934 Miss. Laws ch. 146.
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of Mississippi. It does not use the word "confidentiality," and it
states that only the name of a depositor and the amount of his
deposit shall not be disclosed. However, an implication emerges
from the statute that all types of customer records are to be kept
confidential-an implication strengthened by a statutory prohibi-
tion placed upon the Commissioner of the Mississippi Department
of Banking and Consumer Finance and the examiners and em-
ployees of his Department:
None of them shall disclose to any person, official or otherwise, ex-
cept when required in legal proceedings, any fact or information ob-
tained in the course of the performance of their duties, except so far
as it may be incumbent upon them under the law, to report to the
commissioner, or to make public records and publish the same."
It is significant to note that both Sections 81-5-55 and 81-1-
89, while generally prohibiting the disclosure of bank records,
make an exception when the disclosure is required in legal
proceedings.
Subsequent discussion will examine more fully the various
types of legal proceedings in which disclosure of customer records
may be compelled. As a general rule, bank officers may be re-
quired to testify about customer accounts both in deposition pro-
ceedings and during a trial, and customer records may be ob-
tained both during discovery and at trial through the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum. There have been many efforts by both
bank customers and banks themselves to claim that customer
records are exempt from disclosure. The courts have almost uni-
formly rejected such attempts.
As early as 1826, when a bank clerk testifying in an English
court responded to a question concerning a customer's account
balance by stating that it was the bank's policy not to disclose
such information, Chief Justice Abbott said: "It is not a confiden-
tial communication. I think you are bound to answer the ques-
tion."' 22 In the early nineteenth century, American courts similarly
overruled objections to the production of customer records in legal
proceedings.2 3 In one such case, Chief Justice Campbell of the Su-
preme Court of Michigan referred to "the remarkable notion that
21. MIss. CODE ANN. § 81-1-89 (Supp. 1983).
22. Loyd v. Freshfield, 172 Eng. Rep. 147, 148 (1826).
23. See, e.g., Winder v. Diffenderffer, 2 Bland Ch. 166, 197 (Md. 1829).
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banking business is privileged from scrutiny." 4
During the twentieth century, American courts have contin-
ued to hold that a bank cannot decline to produce information
concerning bank records of customers in legal proceedings. As a
federal court sitting in New York commented in 1904: "It would
be a singular extension of the rule concerning privileged communi-
cations that permitted the identity of one depositing securities
with a banker to be concealed by that merchant. The principle, if
acknowledged, would screen one who had stolen what he so depos-
ited.""5 In rejecting an effort by a customer to prevent a broker
from complying with two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Circuit Judge Learned
Hand emphasized that "the duty to disclose in a court all perti-
nent information within one's control, testimonially or by produc-
tion of documents, is usually paramount over any private interests
which may be affected." 2 6 As the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia stated:
The court has found no law of the United States which would make
banking records privileged. The decisions are to the contrary. A
banker or broker may not refuse to produce relevant documents on
the ground that communications between him and his customers are
confidential and privileged. 7
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York reached a similar conclusion in denying a motion by
defendants for a protective order to prevent the deposition of a
bank, a non-party to the litigation, from being taken:
There is no banker-client privilege. The scope of the privilege
doctrine is narrow indeed ...
We see no analytical reason to raise an understandably confi-
dential commercial situation of principal-agent or customer-banker
to a privilege. The duties of confidentiality which a bank may owe a
customer during their course of dealing do not overcome those duties
of relevant disclosure which the customer and his bank may owe
another litigant under the discovery rules."'
24. Heath v. Waters, 40 Mich. 457, 471 (1879).
25. ICC v. Harriman, 157 F. 432, 440 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.), affd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds. 211 U.S. 407 (1908).
26. McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1937).
27. Societe Internationale v. McGranery, III F. Supp. 435, 443 (D.D.C. 1953).
28. Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 21, 22-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
For similar expressions by federal courts that no banker-customer privilege prohibits dis-
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State courts have enunciated similar views.29 In the straightfor-
ward language of the Supreme Court of Minnesota: "A bank or
banker is not privileged from disclosing the facts concerning a de-
positor's or customer's business with the bank.""0
The foregoing expressions that bank records must be dis-
closed in legal proceedings are based upon "the longstanding prin-
ciple that 'the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence,'
except for those persons protected by a constitutional, common-
law, or statutory privilege."31 As the United States Supreme
Court declared in United States v. Nixon,32 the most famous of
cases involving a privilege claim:
The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is
both fundamental and comprehensive. . . . The very integrity of the
justice system and public confidence in the system depend on full
disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evi-
dence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function
of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of
evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense."3
II. LIABILITY FOR PRODUCTION WITHOUT SUBPOENA
While bank records are not privileged from production in le-
gal proceedings, banks should be certain that they do not release
customer records unless there has been service of compulsory legal
process. To release customer records to a third party in the ab-
sence of a subpoena duces tecum or other lawful process can ex-
closure of the customer's records in judicial proceedings, see United States v. Prevatt, 526
F.2d 400, 402 (5th Cir. 1976); Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Grand Jury Investigation, 417 F. Supp. 389, 391-92 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242, 1248 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds sub nom. California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); In
re Insull Utility Investments, 27 F. Supp. 887, 889-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
29. In re Davies, 68 Kan. 791, 794-95, 75 P. 1048, 1049 (1904); In re Addonizio, 53
N.J. 107, 133, 248 A.2d 531, 546 (1968); Woolley v. Hiner, 164 Or. 161, 172, 100 P.2d
608, 612 (1940); Biggers v. State, 358 S.W.2d 188, 191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Smith v.
Dawson, 234 S.W. 690, 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); State v. Hambrick, 65 Wyo. 1, 45-46,
196 P.2d 661, 678, reh'g denied, 65 Wyo. 55, 198 P.2d 969 (1948).
30. State ex rel. G. M. Gustafson Co. v. Crookston Trust Co., 222 Minn. 17, 23-24,
22 N.W.2d 911, 916 (1946). For other statements repudiating the idea of a banker-cus-
tomer privilege, see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286, at 528-29 (McNaughton rev. 1961);
81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 141, at 182 (1976); 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 256, at 742 (1957);
Annot., 109 A.L.R. 1450 (1937); Limburg, The Bankers' and Brokers' Privilege, 25
COLUM. L. REV. 152, 152-53 (1925).
31. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (quoting United States v. Bryan,
339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)); see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980).
32. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
33. Id. at 709.
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pose the bank to liability. Even if the third person seeking the
records is clothed with some official authority-for example, a
chief of police or a government prosecutor, the bank should insist
upon a subpoena duces tecum or other process before it discloses a
customer's records.
The leading American case is Peterson v. Idaho First Na-
tional Bank.34 In that case, an employer contacted an employee's
banker and asked to be advised of any activity by the employee
that might bring discredit to the company. The banker subse-
quently told the employer that the employee's personal financial
situation was precarious and that the bank was dishonoring many
checks written by the employee on account of insufficient funds.
The employee then sued the bank. The trial court dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The
Supreme Court of Idaho reversed, holding that the complaint
stated a claim for breach of the bank's implied contract not to
disclose information concerning the customer's account. The Su-
preme Court stated:
It is inconceivable that a bank would at any time consider itself
at liberty to disclose the intimate details of its depositors' accounts.
Inviolate secrecy is one of the inherent and fundamental precepts of
the relationship of the bank and its customers or depositors ...
It is implicit in the contract of the bank with its customer or
depositor that no information may be disclosed by the bank or its
employees concerning the customer's or depositor's account, and
that, unless authorized by law or by the customer or depositor, the
bank must be held liable for breach of the implied contract.35
Relying upon the Idaho precedent, a Florida appellate court
reversed a trial court's dismissal of a complaint brought by a cus-
tomer against a bank for divulging financial information about the
customer to a third party. The appellate tribunal said: "We are of
the opinion that this complaint alleged a cause of action for viola-
tion of an implied duty on the part of a national bank not to dis-
close information negligently, wilfully or maliciously or intention-
ally to third parties, concerning the depositor's account."3 Courts
in Maryland,37 Missouri, 38 and Oklahoma 9 have reached similar
34. 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961).
35. Id. at 588, 367 P.2d at 290.
36. Milohnich v. First National Bank of Miami Springs, 224 So. 2d at 762 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
37. Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 44 Md. App. 335, 408 A.2d 758 (1979).
38. Pigg v. Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
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conclusions.
These holdings that a bank can be civilly liable for divulging
customer records to a third party without compulsory process re-
cently led a Mississippi bank, upon the advice of the author, to
decline to honor an administrative subpoena duces tecum issued
by the Mississippi Secretary of State. This case well illustrates the
type dilemma in which banks can find themselves as they attempt
to protect the confidentiality of bank records. The case points up
the type issues to which bank counsel should be sensitive.
In the autumn of 1981, the Secretary of State became suspi-
cious that certain persons were engaged in securities fraud
through a corporation known as Gulf Coast Energy, Inc. The cor-
poration maintained a bank account at First State Bank, Gulfport,
Mississippi. The Secretary of State conducted an investigation
pursuant to the Mississippi Uniform Securities Act."' Relying on
a provision of the Act giving him the power to subpoena witnesses
and to require the production of documents and records as part of
an investigation,41 the Secretary of State issued an administrative
subpoena duces tecum dated September 29, 1981, requiring First
State Bank to produce for inspection all books, papers, documents,
wire transfer logs, and records reflecting the accounts of Gulf
Coast Energy, Inc.
The bank, in a formal letter prepared by the author of this
article and hand delivered to the Secretary of State, respectfully
declined to comply with the administrative subpoena duces te-
cum.42 The letter pointed out that compliance might well consti-
tute a violation of Section 81-5-55 of the Mississippi Code, which
prohibits disclosure of the amount of a customer's deposit "except
when required to be done in legal proceedings.""3 The letter made
mention of the Idaho, Florida, Maryland, and Missouri prece-
39. Djowharzadeh v. City National Bank and Trust Co. of Norman, 646 P.2d 616
(Okla. Ct. App. 1982) (loan officer disclosed customer's confidential real estate investment
plans to wives of bank chairman and bank president, and wives purchased real estate for
their own accounts).
40. 1981 Miss. Laws ch. 521 (codified at MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-71-701 through -
705 (Supp. 1983)).
41. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-71-709 (Supp. 1983).
42. Letter from James A. Peden, Jr. to Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Secretary of State
(October 7, 1981).
43. Miss. CODE ANN. § 81-5-55 (1972). See supra text accompanying note 19. The
term "'legal proceedings" appears to refer to actions at law, not to administrative investiga-
tions like that being conducted by the Secretary of State. See Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of
New York v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel and Iron Co., 241 Ala. 545, 549, 3 So. 2d 306, 309
(1941).
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dents44 and explained that compliance with the administrative
subpoena duces tecum could potentially expose First State Bank
both to civil and criminal liability. The letter further explained
that the bank stood ready to produce the requested records in re-
sponse to a proper court order.
The Secretary of State, upon the advice of the Attorney Gen-
eral's office, verbally acknowledged that the concerns of the bank
were not without merit. The Secretary of State thereupon filed
suit in the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds
County, Mississippi, and on March 3, 1982, obtained a citation
directing the bank to produce the requested documents concerning
Gulf Coast Energy, Inc. The bank complied with the citation and
produced the records. At the request of the bank's counsel, the
court included in an order dated July 27, 1982, a paragraph re-
leasing and discharging First State Bank, together with its officers
and employees, from any liability to Gulf Coast Energy, Inc., for
producing the said records.
45
It is simply prudent practice for bank counsel to insist upon a
judicial subpoena duces tecum or an appropriate court order
before allowing a bank to deliver confidential information con-
cerning a customer's account to a third party, even if the third
party holds some official position. The bank may have to incur
certain legal expenses in asking the third party to obtain a court
order, but those expenses will be substantially less than the costs
of defending a suit or paying a judgment for breach of the statu-
tory duty not to disclose confidential information about a cus-
tomer's account.
There are instances where courts have indicated that a bank
might escape liability for disclosing customer records to a third
party in the absence of legal process. The Court of Appeals of
Washington has stated that, where a bank itself is being victim-
ized by a customer's fraudulent scheme, the bank may respond to
police inquiries about the customer and his account transactions.46
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has ruled that a bank, having
knowledge that a customer is engaged in fraudulent activities, is
under a duty to disclose that knowledge before making a loan that
would further the fraud. 7
44. See supra text accompanying notes 34-38.
45. Pittman v. Gulf Coast Energy, Inc., No. 118,591 (Chan. Ct., First Jud. Dist.,
Hinds Co., Miss., July 27, 1982).
46. State v. McCray, 15 Wash. App. 810, 551 P.2d 1376 (1976).
47. Richfield Bank & Trust Co. v. Sjogren, 309 Minn. 362, 244 N.W.2d 648 (1976).
19831
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
In 1983, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri adjudicated a complaint brought against a
bank and a municipal police department. At the request of the
police department but without a subpoena, the bank delivered
certain financial records of a customer to the police. The customer
filed a civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging viola-
tion of his constitutional right to privacy. The court granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendants, ruling that the defendants had
not violated any constitutionally protected right and that a Section
1983 action would thus not lie.48 Had the plaintiff sued in state
court for breach by the bank of its duty to keep his bank records
and account transactions confidential, the outcome of the suit
might well have been different.
For a bank to deliver the confidential bank records of a cus-
tomer to a third party, where no subpoena duces tecum or other
appropriate court order has been served upon it, is simply to invite
litigation and to expose the bank to civil liability. As citizens be-
come increasingly conscious of considerations of privacy, they are
ever more likely to seek damages for breach by a bank of the duty
to keep their bank records confidential.
III. PRIVACY
Concern for privacy is not of recent vintage in the United
States. That concern was part of the motivation for the American
Revolution.49 When the Founding Fathers proclaimed the Bill of
Rights, considerations of privacy led them to announce in the
fourth amendment the "right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures. ' '50  Many state constitutions have similar
provisions.
51
Judge Cooley first articulated the right of personal privacy in
the late nineteenth century when he spoke of the "right to be let
alone." '52 Shortly thereafter two Boston lawyers, Samuel D. War-
ren and Louis D. Brandeis, the latter being a future Supreme
Court Justice, used Judge Cooley's phrase as the basis for a fa-
48. Williams v. City Bank, 566 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
49. L. PAPER, BRANDEIS 34 (1983).
50. U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
51. In Mississippi, for example, the constitutional language reads as follows: "The
people shall be secure in their persons, houses, and possessions, from unreasonable seizure
or search .... " Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 23.
52. T. COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
[VOL. 4:1
DISCLOSURE OF CUSTOMER RECORDS
mous law review article which advocated protecting people against
invasions of privacy by other citizens.5 3 Almost four decades later
Justice Brandeis further endorsed his views on the right of privacy
and the constitutional basis therefor in his classic dissent in a
wiretapping case:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signifi-
cance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of
life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Amer-
icans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensa-
tions. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
for civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion
by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, by whatever
means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
54
The majority opinion in Olmstead, which found no fourth
amendment violation in the government's secret wiretapping of a
telephone conversation, was overturned and the Brandeis view of
privacy was vindicated in 1967, when the United States Supreme
Court ruled that government eavesdropping on a telephone con-
versation violated privacy rights protected by the fourth
amendment.55
In 1965, the United States Supreme Court, in striking down
a Connecticut statute forbidding use of contraceptives, ruled that
married persons using contraceptives were within a "zone of pri-
vacy," a zone created by "penumbras" emanating from specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights. 56 In subsequent cases, the Su-
preme Court has enlarged upon the constitutionally protected
right of privacy, particularly in cases involving the home, mar-
riage, and procreation. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,57 the Court ruled
that the right of privacy guaranteed access to contraceptives by
unmarried persons. In Roe v. Wade,5" the Court ruled that, sub-
ject to certain limitations, the right of privacy permitted a woman
53. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). Dean
Prosser later referred to this article as "the outstanding example of the influence of legal
periodicals upon American law." Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
54. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
55. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
56. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
57. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
58. 410 U.S. 113, 152-55 (1973).
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to have an abortion notwithstanding state statutes to the contrary.
The Court has also invoked the right of privacy to hold unconsti-
tutional a statute requiring spousal consent or, in the case of un-
married minors, parental consent for abortion59 and a statute
prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to minors under the age
of sixteen.60
Congress has joined the Supreme Court in seeking to protect
the right of privacy. In 1970, finding a need to insure that credit
reporting agencies act with "respect for the consumer's right to
privacy,""1 Congress amended the Consumer Credit Protection
Act of 196862 to impose strict procedures and requirements on
consumer credit reporters.63
Four years later Congress enacted the Privacy Act of 19744
to safeguard individual privacy from intrusions arising out of the
misuse of federal records. In the purpose clause of the legislation,
Congress found that "the right to privacy is a personal and funda-
mental right protected by the Constitution of the United
States."65 Congress has also enacted laws to protect privacy rights
in regard to education records 6 and, by virtue of the Privacy Pro-
tection Act of 1980,67 to protect members of the news media from
search and seizure of their work products by government officers.
Most important for the purposes of this article is the passage
by Congress of the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978,68
which limits access by agencies of the federal government to cus-
tomer financial records maintained by banks and other financial
institutions. This Act will be discussed in greater detail in part VI
infra.
It may thus be said that during the last twenty years both the
59. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60 (1975).
60. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1976).
61. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 602(a)(4), 84 Stat. 1114, 1128 (1970) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4) (1970)).
62. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968).
63. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1970).
64. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976)).
65. Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(a)(4), 88 Stat. 1896 (1974).
66. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1982).
67. Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa
through 2000aa-12 (Supp. IV 1980)). This legislation was a congressional response to the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547
(1978), upholding a police search of the officers of a college newspaper pursuant to a
search warrant.
68. Pub. L. No. 95-630, title XI, 92 Stat. 3697 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §9
3401-3422 (Supp. 11 1978)). The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 is a separately
named title of the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641.
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United States Supreme Court and Congress have evidenced an in-
creasing interest in protecting the privacy rights of American citi-
zens. Privacy has been the subject of analysis by authors and
scholarly commentators,69 and invasion of privacy is well recog-
nized as an actionable tort."0
The Supreme Court of Mississippi first recognized the right
of privacy in 1951, when it held that the right did not justify the
action of a sheriff in assaulting a newspaper photographer taking
photographs of the sheriff without his consent in connection with a
legitimate news story.7 In 1976, the Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi, recognizing that "the law of privacy has developed along
divergent lines and amid a welter of confusing judicial pronounce-
ments," reversed the trial court's sustaining of a demurrer and
allowed a suit for invasion of privacy to proceed against a newspa-
per publisher for publishing names and photographs identifying
specific children as "mentally retarded."72
The Mississippi Supreme Court, like its counterparts in most
other states, has never from a constitutional perspective analyzed
the right of privacy as it applies to bank records. The first state
tribunal to make such an analysis of this subject was the Supreme
Court of California. In Burrows v. Superior Court, 3 the Califor-
nia tribunal dealt with a case involving possible grand theft by an
attorney. A judge issued a warrant authorizing a search of the
suspect's office for bank statements, cancelled checks, and account
records. Deputy sheriffs executed the search warrant and seized
certain bank records. Based upon these records, a detective in the
sheriff's office informally contacted the banks where the suspect
maintained accounts and requested copies of the suspect's bank
statements and other financial records. Although no warrant, sub-
poena duces tecum, or other compulsory process was served on the
banks, at least one bank provided copies of the suspect's financial
records.
69. See, e.g., A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); M. MAYER, RIGHTS OF
PRIVACY (1972); Joyce, The Privacy Act: A Sword and a Shield But Sometimes Neither,
99 MIL. L. REV. 113 (1983); Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421
(1980); Symposium on Privacy, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 251-435 (1966); Prosser, Pri-
vacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); Davis, What Do We Mean by "'Right to Privacy"?, 4
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1959).
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1976); 3 J. DOOLEY, MODERN
TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION §§ 35.01-35.08, at 1-13 (1977); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 802-18 (4th ed. 1971).
71. Martin v. Dorton, 210 Miss. 668, 50 So. 2d 391 (1951).
72. Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 326 So. 2d 471, 473 (Miss. 1976).
73. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
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After being charged with grand theft, the accused moved to
suppress the bank records. The trial court denied the motion. The
accused then filed a petition asking the California Supreme Court
to issue a writ of mandate compelling the trial court to approve
his suppression motion. The supreme court granted him relief. In-
terestingly enough, it based its ruling not upon the fourth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, but upon the prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures in the California Con-
stitution."4 The Supreme Court of California said:
It cannot be gainsaid that the customer of a bank expects that
the documents, such as checks, which he transmits to the bank in
the course of his business operations, will remain private, and that
such expectation is reasonable ...
A bank customer's reasonable expectation is that, absent
compulsion by legal process, the matters he reveals to the bank will
be utilized by the bank only for internal purposes. Thus, we hold
petitioner had a reasonable expectation that the bank would main-
tain the confidentiality of those papers which originated with him in
check form and of the bank statements into which a record of those
same checks had been transformed pursuant to internal bank
practice.
We hold that any bank statements or copies thereof obtained by
the sheriff and prosecutor without the benefit of legal process were
acquired as the result of an illegal search and seizure . . . and that
the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress such
documents. 5
The opinion does not indicate whether the accused filed a civil suit
against the bank which divulged his records without legal process.
A suit for invasion of privacy rights would probably have been
successful.
IV. GIVING NOTICE TO CUSTOMER
Less than a year after the Burrows pronouncement, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court amplified its views on the confidentiality of
customers' bank records. In Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior
Court,7" a party to civil litigation sought to take the deposition of
the president of a bank and to examine a customer's bank records
74. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
75. Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 243-45, 529 P.2d 590, 593-95, 118
Cal. Rptr. 166, 169-71 (1974).
76. 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal.Rptr. 553 (1975).
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that were relevant to the litigation. The bank, objecting to the dis-
closure of confidential records, sought a protective order. When
the matter reached the California Supreme Court, that body ar-
ticulated the duty which banks have in such circumstances. The
court noted that a 1974 amendment to the state constitution had
declared privacy to be an inalienable right. 77 Existing procedures,
said the court, were inadequate to protect a customer's privacy
interest in his bank records when they were the object of discovery
in civil litigation to which the customer was not a party:
Pursuant to existing law, when bank customer information is sought,
the bank has no obligation to notify the customer of the proceedings,
and disclosure freely takes place unless the bank chooses to protect
the customer's interest and elects to seek a protective order on his
behalf.
[I]t is readily apparent that the existing discovery scheme
is inadequate to protect the bank customer's right of privacy which
now is constitutionally founded. The protection of such right should
not be entirely left to the protection of third persons . . . . On the
other hand, we readily acknowledge that relevant bank customer in-
formation should not be wholly privileged and insulated from scru-
tiny by civil litigants.
Therefore, said the California Supreme Court:
Striking a balance between the competing considerations, we con-
clude that before confidential customer information may be disclosed
in the course of civil discovery proceedings, the bank must take rea-
sonable steps to notify its customer of the pendency and nature of
the proceedings and to afford the customer a fair opportunity to as-
sert his interests by objecting to disclosure, by seeking an appropri-
ate protective order, or by instituting other legal proceedings to limit
the scope or nature of the matters sought to be discovered.
7
1
By this holding, the California Supreme Court placed on Cal-
ifornia banks a heavy legal burden of notifying a customer (or
taking other steps to protect his privacy interests) in the event
that customer's bank records were subpoenaed.
Whether the target of discovery of an investigation must be
given notice of a subpoena, judicial or administrative, is an issue
still in fermentation. The Appellate Court of Illinois, taking a po-
sition different from that advanced by the California Supreme
77. CAL. CONST. art. I, § i.
78. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 656-58, 542 P.2d 979-
80, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553, 555-56.
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Court, recently held in a criminal case that a defendant was not
entitled to suppress her records produced by a bank pursuant to a
grand jury subpoena. The Illinois court so ruled even though the
bank had not complied with an Illinois statute 9 requiring banks
to give notice to a customer before disclosing his financial records
pursuant to a subpoena. The court held:
We do not agree that this notice provision provides [defendant]
Jackson with grounds to suppress the subpoena of her bank records.
The statute by its terms only tries to set out the obligations which a
bank owes to its bank customers. These are the obligations of confi-
dentiality and the obligation of notice to a customer if this confiden-
tiality is abridged. The statute does not attempt to regulate govern-
mental intrusion into a customer's confidential bank records. Thus
relying solely upon this statute, Jackson cannot attempt to suppress
a governmental subpoena or claim the right to notice when one is
issued."0
The Illinois court did acknowledge in its opinion that a right
to privacy enunciated in the Illinois Constitution8 gave Illinois
citizens a reasonable expectation of privacy in their bank
records. 82 What the court did not express-but what is implied in
the opinion-is that the defendant had a civil cause of action
against the bank which failed to give her notification for violation
of privacy rights protected by both a state statute and the Illinois
Constitution.
It is interesting to note that on June 18, 1984, the United
States Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the Securities and
Exchange Commission is not required to give notice to the target
of an administrative investigation that it has issued an administra-
tive subpoena to a third party holding business records of the tar-
get.83 In so ruling, the Supreme Court reversed a decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that it was
only by receipt of such notice that a target could insure that the
SEC investigation was being conducted in accordance with consti-
tutional requirements.8" Speaking through Justice Marshall, the
Supreme Court stated that notice of the administrative subpoena
was not required to be given to the target under any constitutional
79. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, § 48.1(d) (1981).
80. People v. Jackson, 116 Ill. App. 3d 430, 436-37, 452 N.E.2d 85, 90 (1983).
81. ILL. CONST. art. I. § 6.
82. People v. Jackson, 452 N.E.2d at 88-89.
83. SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 52 U.S.L.W. 4815 (U.S. June 18, 1984).
84. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC, 704 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1983).
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provision, under any securities statute, or under the theory that
the target has a substantive right to insist that administrative sub-
poenas issued to third parties meet constitutional requirements.
8 5
The Supreme Court did not think it necessary to discuss the issue
of privacy. This holding strongly suggests that the United States
Supreme Court would find no federal constitutional requirement
that a bank customer be notified when his bank records are
subpoenaed.
Although Mississippi has no constitutional guarantee of pri-
vacy and has no statute that requires a bank to give notice to a
customer when his bank records are subpoenaed, common sense
dictates that a bank receiving a subpoena duces tecum notify the
customer that his bank records are being sought. As is discussed
in part VII, infra, there is an exception to this suggestion in re-
gard to grand jury subpoenas.
With some frequency it happens that Mississippi banks repre-
sented by the law firm of which the author of this article is a
member are served with a subpoena duces tecum for the bank
records of a customer who is not a party to the litigation. In such
circumstances, the firm ordinarily advises the bank to give tele-
phonic notification to its customer whose records are being sought
and then to send a letter enclosing a copy of the subpoena duces
tecum. The firm advises the bank to inform the customer that it
must comply with the compulsory legal process unless the cus-
tomer goes into court and obtains an order quashing the subpoena
duces tecum or secures some other protective order. Although cus-
tomers do not relish having litigants examine their bank records,
they are invariably grateful to the bank for giving them notifica-
tion. Thus, the giving of notice to the customer, while not a formal
legal requirement in Mississippi, is a prudent step that promotes
good will for the bank.
On rare occasions a bank customer receiving notice from the
bank that his records have been subpoenaed will insist that the
bank keep his records confidential. He will instruct the bank to
disregard the subpoena. Such a customer may threaten to sue the
bank. In these circumstances, the bank would be well advised to
85. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4816-19. As enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964), the constitutional requirements are (i)
that the agency has a legitimate purpose for its investigation, (2) that the inquiry is rele-
vant to that purpose, (3) that the agency does not possess the information being sought,
and (4) that the agency has followed required administrative procedures.
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seek a protective order pursuant to the applicable discovery rules8"
and to give notice of its motion to all interested parties, including
the irate customer. The motion for a protective order would state
that the bank could neither honor nor disregard the subpoena du-
ces tecum without putting itself in peril and would basically re-
quest the court to tell the bank what to do. This procedure should
give maximum protection to the bank and preclude a suit for
breach of the implied duty not to disclose bank records or for in-
vasion of privacy.
Parenthetically, it should be pointed out that a bank served
with a subpoena duces tecum may find it necessary to move for a
protective order to have the party seeking a discovery to pay the
cost of searching for, and reproducing, customer records. Depend-
ing on the scope of the subpoena duces tecum, compliance may
require substantial personnel time and significant reproduction
costs. Searching for microfilm copies of cancelled checks can be
particularly time-consuming and expensive. Bank counsel should,
in such circumstances, contact the attorney for the party seeking
discovery and ask for advance payment of the estimated cost of
complying with the subpoena duces tecum or at least secure an
agreement from the attorney that he will pay for the cost of com-
pliance. Often negotiations on the issue of costs will result in the
attorney seeking discovery substantially reducing the scope of the
subpoena duces tecum.
If no agreement about costs can be reached, bank counsel
should file a motion for a protective order to require the party
seeking discovery to pay search and reproduction costs. Both the
federal and state rules governing discovery in civil litigation au-
thorize courts to enter a protective order to protect a party from
"undue burden or expense."87 As a leading treatise explains: "The
court may order the party seeking discovery to pay the expenses
caused thereby ... ."88
Congress has manifested an intent that the Internal Revenue
Service reimburse financial institutions for the cost of reproducing
customer records.8 9 In a provision of the previously mentioned
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1); Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(d). See
also MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-226(c) (Supp. 1983).
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(d). See also MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-
1-226(c) (Supp. 1983).
88. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2038, at 277
(1970).
89. 26 U.S.C. § 7610 (1982).
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Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978,90 Congress mandated that
other government agencies obtaining financial records pay
financial institutions for the expense of providing the requesting
documents:
[A] Government authority shall pay to the financial institution as-
sembling or providing financial records pertaining to a customer and
in accordance with procedures established by this chapter a fee for
reimbursement for such costs as are reasonably necessary and which
-have been directly incurred in searching for, reproducing, or trans-
porting books, papers, records, or other data required or requested to
be produced. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem shall, by regulation, establish the rates and conditions under
which such payment may be made."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated in
applying this statute to a grand jury proceeding: "It is clear, and
the government concedes, that in situations where an individual
customer of the bank is being investigated, the bank could recover
its costs under Section 3415. ''"2 In 1975, even before Congress
had enacted statutes requiring the Internal Revenue Service and
other federal agencies to pay financial institutions for the costs
incurred in providing customer records, a California federal court
had judicially imposed a reimbursement requirement. The court
gave the following rationale for its holding:
This 'cost' is not predictably part of the banking business, does not
fall upon all equally, and was not specifically evaluated by the legis-
lature and imposed by it upon all those who do a banking business.
Although the statute demands compliance with legitimate sum-
monses, it is silent on the issue of reimbursement. Given that silence,
and the dictates of the Due Process Clause, this court feels that it
would be unreasonable to expect a party such as respondent to bear
anything other than nominal cost in complying with a government
summons. The duties of a citizen to his government. . . do not run
so far as absorbing a $2500 expense in aid of a government investi-
gation of a third party.
It will therefore be ordered that the United States reimburse
respondent for the $2545.28 which it expended in complying with
90. Pub. L. No. 95-630, title XI, 92 Stat. 3697 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§
3401-3421 (Supp. 11 1978)). See also supra note 68.
91. 12 U.S.C. § 3415 (1982). To implement this statute, the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System has promulgated a reimbursement schedule in Regulation S,
12 C.F.R. § 219.3 (1984).
92. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 636 F.2d 81, 85 (5th Cir. 1981).
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the summons in this case."3
V. THE BANK SECRECY ACT AND THE Shultz AND Miller
DECISIONS
Prior to 1970 the matter of confidentiality of bank records
had attracted little notice on the federal level. Some banks made
copies of customer records as a protection against potential cus-
tomer claims, but by the end of the 1960's many banks had dis-
continued the practice of photocopying checks. Congress perceived
a need for the government, in particular circumstances, to have
access to copies of bank checks.94 In 1970, Congress passed the so-
called Bank Secrecy Act.9 5 Finding that adequate bank records
"have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory
investigations and proceedings,"9 " Congress authorized the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to issue regulations requiring banks and other
financial institutions to follow recordkeeping and reporting re-
quirements. 97 Title I of the Act dealt with recordkeeping; Title II
dealt with reporting. The Secretary subsequently promulgated ap-
propriate regulations to carry out the intent of the Bank Secrecy
Act. Those regulations require a bank to make copies of virtually
every aspect of a customer's transactions, including many types of
checks, and to maintain records of currency transactions of more
than $10,000 involving accounts or persons outside the United
States and to maintain records of extensions of credit (except
those secured by real property) in excess of $5,000. They further
require a reporting by financial institutions of prescribed domestic
and foreign financial transactions.98
A constitutional attack upon the Bank Secrecy Act and the
implementing regulations was not long in coming. In June, 1972,
shortly before the effective date of the regulations, two separate
suits were filed in the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of California. The plaintiffs in one action were a Cali-
93. United States v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 397 F. Supp. 418, 420-21 (C.D.
Cal. 1975). Contra, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 436 F. Supp. 46 (D. Md.
1977).
94. Palmer and Palmer, Complying with the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978,
96 BANKING L.J. 196, 199 (1979).
95. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d,
1829b, 1951-59 (1970), and scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
96. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(l) (1970).
97. Id. §§ 1730d, 1829b(b), 1952 (1970).
98. 31 C.F.R. pt. 103 (1984).
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fornia national bank, individual bank customers, and the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union. The plaintiff in the other action was the
California Bankers Association, suing on behalf of all California
banks. The plaintiffs alleged violation of due process, privacy, and
other rights. The two suits were consolidated for trial before a
three-judge court. Although the court upheld the requirement of
reports on foreign financial transactions,99 although it noted that
bank-customer communications were not privileged, and although
it acknowledged that production of bank records in response to a
subpoena did not violate the fourth amendment, 100 the court ulti-
mately ruled that the requirements concerning reporting of
domestic financial transactions were overbroad violations of cus-
tomers' privacy rights:
[T]he Act in question, insofar as it authorizes the Secretary to re-
quire virtually unlimited reporting from banks and their customers
of domestic financial transactions as a surveillance device for the al-
leged purpose of discovering possible, but unspecified, wrongdoing
among the citizenry, so far exceeds the constitutional limits, as laid
down by the United States Supreme Court for this kind of legisla-
tion, as to unreasonably invade the rights of privacy protected by
The Bill of Rights, particularly the Fourth Amendment provision
protecting 'the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.'10'
The three-judge court thus enjoined the enforcement of the do-
mestic transaction reporting provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act,
with Judge Hamlin dissenting from the finding that those provi-
sions were unconstitutional."0 2
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the
district court's finding of unconstitutionality was erroneous. In an
opinion by Justice Rehnquist, a majority of six justices ruled that
the record-keeping requirements and the costs attendant thereto
did not violate the due process rights of banks,103 that plaintiffs'
claims of first and fifth amendment violations were premature, 04
and that Title I recordkeeping provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act
did not violate the fourth amendment:
99. Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242, 1244-45 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
100. Id. at 1248.
101. Id. at 1251.
102. Id.
103. California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 50 (1974).
104. Id. at 56, 75.
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We see nothing in the Act which violates the Fourth Amendment
Rights of these plaintiffs. Neither the provisions of Title I nor the
implementing regulations require that any information contained in
the records be disclosed to the Government; both the legislative his-
tory and the regulations make specific reference to the fact that ac-
cess to the records is to be controlled by existing legal process.'
In regard to the Title II reporting requirements of the Bank
Secrecy Act, the Court held that the reporting requirements on
foreign financial transactions fell within the congressional power
to legislate on foreign commerce.' 6 As for Title II domestic trans-
action reporting requirements, the Court held that those require-
ments did not abridge any fourth amendment rights of the banks
themselves.'0 7 Finally, the Court determined that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to assert fourth amendment claims in regard to
Title II domestic reporting requirements.0 8
Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented, with Jus-
tice Douglas labeling as "unadulterated nonsense" the underlying
assumption of the Act that all bank records have a high degree of
usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or
proceedings.' 9
Those who viewed the Shultz holding with disfavor were even
more disturbed two years later when on April 21, 1976, the
United States Supreme Court announced another major decision
concerning bank records. In United States v. Miller,'" the Court
ruled that a bank depositor had no fourth amendment interest in
bank records maintained by banks pursuant to the Bank Secrecy
Act. The case arose when a United States District Court, in which
a defendant was being prosecuted for possessing an unregistered
still, denied the defendant's motion to suppress records obtained
from his banks under allegedly defective subpoenas duces tecum.
After being convicted, the defendant appealed. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that ob-
taining copies of the defendant's records "by means of a faulty
subpoena duces tecum constituted an unlawful invasion of [defen-
dant] Miller's privacy, and that any evidence so obtained should
105. Id. at 52.
106. Id. at 60.
107. Id. at 66.
108. Id. at 69.
109. Id. at 85 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
110. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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have been suppressed."' 11
In reversing the Fifth Circuit, Justice Powell spoke for a
seven-man majority of the United States Supreme Court:
On their face, the documents subpoenaed here are not respon-
dent's "private papers." [The] respondent can assert neither owner-
ship nor possession. Instead, these are the business records of the
banks ...
[W]e perceive no legitimate "expectation of privacy" in their
contents. The checks are not confidential communications but nego-
tiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions. All of the
documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips,
contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and ex-
posed to their employees in the ordinary course of business. The lack
of any legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the information
kept in bank records was assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank
Secrecy Act, the expressed purpose of which is to require records to
be maintained because they "have a high degree of usefulness in
criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations and proceedings." 12
U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1) ....
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another,
that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government ...
This analysis is not changed by the mandate of the Bank Se-
crecy Act that records of depositors' transactions be maintained by
banks ...
Since no Fourth Amendment interests of the depositor are im-
plicated here, this case is governed by the general rule that the issu-
ance of a subpoena to a third party to obtain the records of that
party does not violate the rights of a defendant."
2
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented. The former, citing
the holding of the California Supreme Court in Burrows v. Supe-
rior Court,"3 opined that bank customers do have an expectation
of privacy in their bank records that is protected by the fourth
amendment. 14
The majority's decision in Miller has attracted considerable
comment. 1 5 It also spurred action, both within the halls of Con-
111. United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751, 756 (5th Cir. 1974) rev'd, 425 U.S. 435
(1976).
112. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440, 442-44 (1976).
113. Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal.Rptr. 166
(1974).
114. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 447-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. See, e.g., Walker, Where Banks Stand in Defending Privacy of Customer, 73
AM. BANKERS ASSN. BANKING J. 127 (1981); Alexander and Spurgeon, Privacy, Banking
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gress and in certain statehouses, to provide statutory guarantees
concerning the privacy of bank records.
VI. RESPONSES TO Miller
A. The Tax Reform Act of 1976
In the fall of 1976, Congress passed a comprehensive tax
measure, the Tax Reform Act of 1976.116 Included in this legisla-
tion was a provision inserting into the Internal Revenue Code of
195411 two new sections concerning the administrative summons
procedure to be employed by the Internal Revenue Service in
seeking the production of financial records from third-party
recordkeepers such as banks." 8
The Internal Revenue Service had long possessed the power
to examine financial records, to summon persons having custody
of such records to appear and produce those records, and to re-
quire the custodian to give testimony under oath about the
records. 9 The federal courts had repeatedly upheld this power
against challenges alleging fourth and fifth amendment viola-
tions1 20 and had enforced administrative summonses issued to
banks for the production of customer records. 21 Moreover, be-
cause the courts considered financial records to be the property of
the bank and not of the customer, the Internal Revenue Service
was under no duty to give notice to that customer when it sum-
moned his records. 22 Even if a customer learned of the IRS sum-
mons, he lacked standing to object in court to its issuance.1 21 Only
the bank itself would have such standing.1 24 When the United
Records and the Supreme Court: A Before and After Look at Miller, 10 Sw. U. L. REV.
13 (1978); Comment, A Bank Customer Has No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy of
Bank Records: United States v. Miller, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 414 (1977).
116. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified at various sections of 26
U.S.C.).
117. Act of August 16, 1954, Pub. L. No. 591, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 3 (1954).
118. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7609-10 (1976).
119. 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1982).
120. Galbraith v. United States, 387 F.2d 617, 618 (10th Cir. 1968); Hinchcliff v.
Clarke, 371 F.2d 697, 700 (6th Cir. 1967); Eberhart v. Broadrock Development Corp., 296
F.2d 685, 687 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 871 (1962); Foster v. United States,
265 F.2d 183, 187-88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
121. United States v. Wills, 475 F. Supp. 492 (M.D. Fla. 1979); United States v.
First National Bank of Mobile, 67 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ala. 1946).
122. Application of Cole, 342 F.2d 5, 7-8 (2d Cir. 1965).
123. United States v. Sahley, 526 F.2d 913, 916 (5th Cir. 1976); Harris v. United
States, 413 F.2d 316, 318 (9th Cir. 1969); Galbraith v. United States, 387 F.2d 617, 618
(10th Cir. 1968); Application of Cole, 342 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965); Foster v. United
States, 265 F.2d 183, 188 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
124. DeMasters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79, 85 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 375 U.S. 936
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States Supreme Court in 1975 upheld the constitutionality of a
"John Doe" summons issued by the IRS pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §
7602,125 it was obvious to all observers that, at least on the federal
level, a bank customer's privacy rights in his bank records were
virtually nil. A call arose, especially after the Supreme Court
ruled in Miller, for legislation to protect these privacy rights.126
It was in this atmosphere that Congress inserted administra-
tive summons provisions into the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Con-
gress mandated that any person whose financial records were sum-
moned by the IRS from a third-party recordkeeper such as a bank
be given notice of the summons no later than three days after ser-
vice and at least fourteen days (later amended to twenty-three
days)127 prior to the return date. Notice could be given by certi-
fied or registered mail sent to the person's last known address.
Congress expressly gave the party noticed the right to seek to
quash the summons within twenty days after notice or to intervene
in any enforcement proceeding, thus negating the judicial rulings
on standing. The IRS was required to secure court authorization
to issue "John Doe" summonses. 28 These provisions significantly
enhanced the privacy rights of taxpayers.
The new legislation also gave new protection to banks, declar-
ing that they would not be liable to customers for disclosing bank
records in "good-faith reliance" on a certificate from the IRS that
the twenty-day period in which a party could seek to quash the
summons had expired with no action on his part or on a certificate
that the party consented to the examination of his records.' 29
Moreover, the Act recognized that financial institutions were enti-
tled to reimbursement for costs incurred in responding to an IRS
summons.
30
B. The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978
The second major legislative response to Miller occurred in
1978, when Congress passed the Right to Financial Privacy Act of
(1963). Cf. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971). For a further discussion of
the issue of standing, see Mortimer, supra note 2, at 837.
125. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975). For an analysis of this deci-
sion, see Note, IRS Access to Bank Records: Proposed Modifications in Administrative
Subpoena Procedure, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 247, 275 (1976).
126. Dunne, Financial Privacy: A Time to Act, 92 BANKING L.J. 425 (1975).
127. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 331(d)(1), 96 Stat. 324, 620 (1982).
128. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a)-(f) (1982).
129. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(i)(2)-(3) (1982).
130. Id. § 7610.
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1978.131 It was the stated purpose of the Act "to protect the cus-
tomers of financial institutions from unwarranted intrusions into
their records while at the same time permitting legitimate law en-
forcement activity." The Act sought "to strike a balance between
the customers' right of privacy and the need of law enforcement
agencies to obtain financial records pursuant to legitimate
investigations." '132
The Act prohibits financial institutions from providing cus-
tomer financial information to any department, agency, officer, or
employee of the federal government except in compliance with the
provisions of the Act.1 31 Moreover, a financial institution is not to
release customer financial records to the government until the gov-
ernment has certified in writing that it has complied with the
Act."" It should be noted that the Act does not attempt to regu-
late disclosure of customer financial records to authorities of state
or local governments.
The Act provides that a customer may authorize a financial
institution to disclose his records by means of a signed and dated
statement containing specified information." 5
The government may obtain records by means of an adminis-
trative subpoena or summons only if "there is reason to believe
that the records are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement in-
quiry." 136 However, the government must send a copy of the sub-
poena or summons and a privacy notice to the customer or person-
ally serve him with a copy and a notice on or before the date of
service on the financial institution. The government is not entitled
to receive the records sought by administrative subpoena or sum-
mons until the expiration of ten days from service of the notice on
the customer or until the expiration of fourteen days from the
mailing of the notice to him."'7
131. Supra note 68. For discussions of the Act, see Metzger, Confidentiality of Bank
Records, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MISSISSIPPI LAW INSTITUTE:
CONSUMER CREDIT AND BANKING LAWS 177-201 (1979); Palmer and Palmer, supra note
94; Note, The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 1059 (1979).
132. H.R. REP. No. 95-1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 9273, 9305.
133. 12 U.S.C. § 3403(a) (Supp. 11 1978). The United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit recently declared that the Act "imposes an affirmative duty on the gov-
ernment and banking officials to safeguard the financial records of individuals utilizing the
services of banks." In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., Inc., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir.
1983).
134. 12 U.S.C. § 3403(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
135. Id. § 3404.
136. Id. § 3405(1).
137. Id. § 3405(2)-(3).
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The Act authorizes the government to obtain financial
records under a search warrant obtained through the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. No later than ninety days after ser-
vice of the warrant on the financial institution, the government
must mail a copy of the warrant and a privacy notice to the cus-
tomer. Upon application by the government, a court may extend
the ninety-day period.1"8
Judicial subpoena is another mechanism sanctioned by the
Act for obtaining customer financial records. The judicial sub-
poena must be authorized by law. It must be used only when the
records sought "are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement in-
quiry. '  As with administrative subpoenas, copies of judicial
subpoenas, together with a privacy notice, must be served upon, or
mailed to, customers whose records are being sought. No records
may be obtained by judicial subpoena until the expiration of ten
days after service of the notice upon the customer or until the
expiration of fourteen days after mailing of the notice." '
Where the government does not have administrative sum-
mons or subpoena authority reasonably available, and where it
seeks financial records which "are relevant to a legitimate law en-
forcement inquiry," the government may seek financial records by
a formal written request. However, such a request must be au-
thorized by regulations promulgated by the head of the depart-
ment or agency seeking the records. In order to utilize the formal
written request mechanism, the government must serve upon, or
mail to, the customer a copy of the request and a privacy notice.
No record may be obtained by formal written request until the
expiration of ten days after service of the notice upon the cus-
tomer or until the expiration of fourteen days after mailing of the
notice."'
There can be no doubt that a central requirement of the
Right to Financial Privacy Act is to require notice to a citizen
that the government is seeking access to his financial records.
However, the Act does provide that a court may delay customer
notice where there is reason to believe that the notice will result in
(1) endangerment to life or personal safety, (2) flight from prose-
cution, (3) destruction of evidence, (4) intimidation of potential
138. Id. § 3406.
139. Id. § 3407(1).
140. Id. § 3407(2)-(3).
141. Id. § 3408.
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witnesses, or (5) the jeopardizing of an investigation or official
proceeding.142
Of particular significance is the fact that the Act gives a cus-
tomer who has received notice that his financial records are the
object of a subpoena, summons, or formal written request the
right to go into court and move to quash the subpoena or sum-
mons or to enjoin the formal written request. 43 Thus, a customer
seeking to prevent government scrutiny of his banking records will
encounter no standing problems.
Upon receiving an administrative subpoena or summons or a
judicial subpoena, a financial institution is required to assemble
the subject customer records and to prepare them for delivery
upon receipt of the government's certificate that it has complied
with the requirements of the Act.' 44 Happily for financial institu-
tions, the Act does provide for reimbursement for the costs in-
curred in assembling and providing financial records to the
government. 1
45
The Act does not apply to every instance in which the gov-
ernment seeks customer financial records. Section 3413 carves out
several exceptions to the Act's coverage. For example, the Act
does not prohibit the disclosure of information to agencies which
supervise or regulate financial institutions. 146 Nor does it prohibit
the disclosure of financial records under the Internal Revenue
Code. 147 The Act does not apply to government attempts to secure
customer financial records under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in litigation to
which the government and the customer are parties. 48 Except in
regard to cost reimbursement, the Act does not apply to the dis-
closure of records pursuant to a subpoena or court order issued in
connection with grand jury proceedings.
1 49
Should a financial institution violate the Act, it may be liable
to the customer for a statutory sum of $100, for actual damages
sustained by the customer, for punitive damages in case of willful
142. Id. §3409.
143. Id. § 3410.
144. Id. § 3411.
145. Id. § 3415. See also supra note 91.
146. 12 U.S.C. § 3413(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
147. Id. § 3413(c). For the Internal Revenue Code provisions, see 26 U.S.C. §§
7602, 7609 (1982).
148. 12 U.S.C. § 3413(e) (Supp. 11 1978).
149. Id. § 3413(i). But see the Act's requirements concerning the use of customer
information obtained from a financial institution under a grand jury subpoena. Id. § 3420.
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or intentional violation, and for court costs and attorney's fees. 50
However, there can be no liability on the part of a financial insti-
tution for disclosure of customer records made in good faith in
reliance upon a government compliance certificate.151
The Right to Financial Privacy Act conveys "a message to
bureaucrats not to treat lightly their access to customer financial
records." '152 It imposes upon banks and other financial institutions
significant new legal duties and responsibilities which their man-
agement and counsel must take care not to violate.15
While the Act is a congressional response to the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Miller, the Act does not re-
ally reverse Miller. The Act does not extend to bank customers a
right against search and seizure of their bank records. The Right
to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 does create a detailed mecha-
nism by which the federal government can obtain customer
financial records for specified purposes under procedures that give
customers reasonable notice of what is occurring and an opportu-
nity, if they so desire, to mount a legal challenge to the govern-
ment's efforts.
C. Responses on State Level
Before the United States Supreme Court announced its
Miller decision in 1976, a few states had enacted statutes gov-
erning confidentiality of, and access to, bank records. The Miller
holding, coming at a time when there was an increasing awareness
of privacy considerations among the American public led states
with such statutes to modify and update their laws and prompted
some states to enact for the first time laws making detailed provi-
sion for confidentiality of, and access to, bank records. At the pre-
sent time, at least eight states have passed legislation on this sub-
ject. Those states include Alaska,1 54 California, 55 Connecticut, 15
Illinois, 157 Louisiana,51 Maryland, 59 New Hampshire, 160 and
150. Id. § 3417(a).
151. Id. § 3417(c).
152. Palmer and Palmer, supra note 94 at 223.
153. Metzger, supra note 131 at 180.
154. ALASKA STAT. § 06.05.175 (1978).
155. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 7460-90 (West 1980).
156. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 36-9j through -9n (1983).
157. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 360 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983).
158. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3571 (West Supp. 1983).
159. MD. FIN. INST. CODE §§ 1-301 through -305 (Supp. 1983).
160. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-C:1 through -C:18 (Supp. 1981).
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Oklahoma."" While the state statutes vary in wording, they gen-
erally prevent a financial institution from disclosing customer
financial records except in instances of customer authorization, ju-
dicial or administrative subpoena, or search warrant. The Califor-
nia and New Hampshire statutes are the most comprehensive. All
eight of the states provide that, in most instances, the customer is
to be given notice that his bank records are being sought.
Because many of these state statutes are of recent vintage,
there has been little judicial interpretation of them. The New
Hampshire Supreme Court has upheld the suppression in a crimi-
nal proceeding of bank records obtained in violation of the New
Hampshire Right to Privacy Act,162 but the Appellate Court of
Illinois has declined to suppress bank records obtained through a
grand jury subpoena even though the requirements of Illinois law
concerning notice to the customer were not met.16 The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland has twice rejected efforts to quash
grand jury subpoenas on the ground that the customers whose
records were subpoenaed lacked standing to complain about
disclosure.16
This article has previously made mention of the California
Supreme Court's 1974 determination in Burrows v. Superior
Court165 that the privacy of bank records was protected by the
prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure found in the
state constitution. 66 In response to Miller, the highest courts of
two other states have taken similar approaches in cases involving
confidentiality of bank records. In 1979, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania reversed a murder sentence based on bank records
obtained through an invalid subpoena secured by the district at-
torney from a court clerk for the local police department where
there was no ongoing legal proceeding of any kind. The Supreme
Court found that this action thwarted the "legitimate expectation
of privacy" held by Pennsylvania citizens in their bank records
and violated the protection against unreasonable search and
seizure found in the Pennsylvania Constitution.
6 7
161. OKLA. STAT. ANN. title 68, §§ 2201-06 (West Supp. 1983).
162. State v. Flynn, 464 A.2d 268, 271 (N.H. 1983).
163. People v. Jackson, 116 Ill. App. 3d 430, 436-37, 452 N.E.2d 85, 90 (1983).
164. In re Special Investigation No. 258, 55 Md. App. 119, 461 A.2d 34, 38 (1983);
In re Special Investigation No. 242, 53 Md. App. 360, 365, 452 A.2d 1319, 1322 (1982).
165. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 246, 529 P.2d 590, 596, 118 Cal.Rptr. 166, 172 (1974).
166. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
167. Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1290 (Pa. 1979), applying PA.
CONST. art. 1, § 8. For an analysis of this decision, see Note, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 363 (1980).
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In 1980, the Supreme Court of Colorado, applying the "un-
reasonable searches and seizures" clause of that state's constitu-
tion, 168 found that a Colorado citizen's "reasonable expectation of
privacy in the bank records of his financial transactions" gave him
standing to challenge a subpoena duces tecum for those records
issued by the Colorado Department of Revenue. 6 9
Thus, at least ten states have responded to Miller, either by
statute or in a judicial decision, by expanding privacy rights in
bank records. Mississippi has made no formal response to the
United States Supreme Court's ruling. In this state, bank records
are protected from disclosure by a common law implied duty and
by a statute that prohibits disclosure of the name of a depositor
and the amount of his deposit "except when required to be done in
legal proceedings.'170 There is no state law requirement that a
bank customer be given notice that his bank records have been
subpoenaed in any legal proceeding.
VII. GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS
If a Mississippi bank receives a subpoena duces tecum for the
bank records of a customer in a civil litigation matter, it is good
business practice-though not a legal duty-to inform the cus-
tomer that the bank is under the compulsion of lawful process to
produce the subpoenaed records and that it must do so unless the
customer obtains an order to quash or some other protective order.
The same statement of good business practice would apply in
criminal prosecutions that are beyond the indictment stage.
But what about grand jury proceedings? Should a bank no-
tify a customer that his bank records have been subpoenaed by a
grand jury, particularly when the prosecuting attorney or the mar-
shal, sheriff, or policeman serving the subpoena notifies the bank
not to inform the customer that he is the subject of a grand jury
investigation? Could a bank or bank officer be held in contempt
168. COLO. CONST. art. 11, § 7.
169. Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 612 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Colo. 1980). See Note, A Right
to Privacy in Bank Records: The Colorado Supreme Court Rejects United States v.
Miller. 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 529 (1981), for a study of the Charnes decision. Cf. In re
First National Bank, Englewood, Colorado, 701 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1983), in which the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that antitax organizations had
standing to challenge a federal grand jury subpoena duces tecum issued to a Colorado bank
to obtain bank records of the organizations. The Tenth Circuit, without mentioning
Charnes, based its holding on the potential chilling effect of the subpoena duces tecum on
first amendment associational rights. For a contrary view of standing to contest the disclos-
ure of bank records, see State v. Overton, 60 N.C. App. 1, 298 S.E.2d 695 (1982).
170. MIss. CODE ANN. § 81-5-55 (1972).
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for giving such notification to a customer?
Several provisions of Mississippi law indicate that state grand
jury proceedings are to be kept confidential. On pain of fine and
imprisonment, a grand juror is not to disclose "the name or testi-
mony of any witness who has been before the grand jury.' 7' For
six months after final adjournment of the grand jury, a juror
"shall not disclose any proceeding or action had by the grand jury
in relation to offenses brought before it."' 72 The oath administered
to jurors contains an admonition of secrecy. 173 The charge to the
grand jury mandated by the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit
Court Practice, as adopted by the Supreme Court of Mississippi
on August 10, 1979, and as amended on October 26, 1982, con-
tains the following language:
The oath which you have taken contains essential principles
which govern you in your deliberations. The oath is your promise
that you will keep secret what takes place in the grand jury room. A
grand juror ... shall not discuss any proceeding or action in rela-
tion to offenses brought before it for six months after the adjourn-
ment of the court in which he was a grand juror. A grand jury shall
not discuss the name or testimony of any witness who has testified
before them. Any disclosure of secrets is punishable by fine or im-
prisonment for contempt of court.
[The charge then explains that one reason for the secrecy]
is that if anyone charged with a crime learns of your investigation,
he is given an opportunity to escape and defeat the process of crimi-
nal justice.
This requirement of secrecy demands that you do not communi-
cate to anyone what has been said or done in the grand jury room
unless you are ordered by a judge in open court to reveal it. The
secrecy of your work is protected by a law which makes it a crime
for others to question you about what happened in the grand jury.
74
The public policy of the state in favor of secrecy of grand
jury proceedings is further illustrated by the popularly named
Open Meetings Act,17 5 which exempts from the requirement of
open meetings "all jury deliberations."' 7 8 The statutes which au-
thorize the subpoenaing of grand jury witnesses'7 7 impose no re-
171. Id. § 13-5-61 (Supp. 1983).
172. Id.
173. Id. § 13-5-45 (1972).
174. Miss. UNIFORM CRIM. R. CIR. CT. PRACTICE 2.01.
175. 1975 Miss. Laws ch. 481 (codified at Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 25-41-1 through -17
(Supp. 1983)).
176. MIss. CODE ANN. § 25-41-3 (Supp. 1983).
177. Grand jury subpoenas may be ordered by the grand jury foreman, id. § 13-5-63
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quirement of secrecy on them. However, a Uniform Criminal Rule
declares:
No . . witness ... shall disclose to any unauthorized person that
an indictment is being found or returned into court against a defen-
dant or disclose any action or proceeding in relation to the indict-
ment before the finding of an indictment or within six months there-
after or before defendant is arrested or gives bail or
recognizance. . . . If such information is disclosed, the disclosing
person may be found in contempt of court punishable by fine or
imprisonment. 78
Obviously, a bank disclosing to a customer that his records
have been subpoenaed by a grand jury may well violate Uniform
Criminal Rule 2.04. Prudence thus dictates that a bank keep se-
cret from its customer the fact that a grand jury has issued a
subpoena duces tecum for his bank records. Disclosure could lead
to a citation for contempt and possibly to fine and a term in jail.
What if a bank receives a subpoena duces tecum for cus-
tomer bank records from a federal grand jury? Is the bank re-
quired to keep this fact secret, or may it make disclosure to the
customer?
In the words of Chief Justice Burger: "The grand jury is an
integral part of our constitutional heritage which was brought to
this country with the common law. The Framers, most of them
trained in English law and traditions, accepted the grand jury as a
basic guarantee of individual liberty . . . .'1 The requirement
for indictment by grand jury appears in the Bill of Rights.180
Among the powers of a grand jury is the right to call witnesses
and to compel their attendance by subpoena.18 As the United
States Supreme Court has said:
[TIhe grand jury's authority to subpoena witnesses is not only his-
toric ..., but essential to its task. Although the powers of the grand
jury are not unlimited and are subject to the supervision of a judge,
the longstanding principle that 'the public . . . has a right to every
man's evidence,' except for those persons protected by a constitu-
tional, common-law, or statutory privilege ..., is particularly appli-
(1972), or issued by the circuit clerk in vacation upon application of the district attorney or
a conservator of the peace. Id. § 99-9-23 (Supp. 1983).
178. Miss. UNIFORM CRIM. R. CIR. CT. PRACTICE 2.04.
179. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571 (1976).
180. U. S. CONST. amend. V.
181. 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 101, at 217 (1982).
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cable to grand jury proceedings.""2
Or, as Justice Powell has written:
The power of a federal court to compel persons to appear and testify
before a grand jury is . . .firmly established. . . The duty to tes-
tify has long been recognized as a basic obligation that every citizen
owes his Government. . . The duty to testify may on occasion be
burdensome and even embarrassing. It may cause injury to a wit-
ness' social and economic status. Yet the duty to testify has been
regarded as 'so necessary to the administration of justice' that the
witness' personal interest in privacy must yield to the public's over-
riding interest in full disclosure.
8
3
As is the case with state grand juries in Mississippi, secrecy is
also a part of federal grand jury proceedings. Federal grand jury
secrecy is "a long-established policy,"""4 which the Supreme
Court deems "indispensable." ' 5 The Supreme Court has empha-
sized that "the proper functioning of our grand jury system de-
pends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. "18"
Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
generally deals with the federal grand jury, implements the policy
of secrecy through subsection (e)(2), which provides:
General Rule of Secrecy. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenogra-
pher, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes re-
corded testimony, an attorney for the Government, or any person to
whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this subdivi-
sion shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, ex-
cept as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of se-
crecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this
rule. A knowing violation of rule 6 may be punished as a contempt
of court.1
87
Noticeably absent from the categories of grand jury partici-
pants covered by Rule 6(e)(2) is the grand jury witness. As Pro-
fessor Wright has written:
No obligation of secrecy can be imposed on any person except those
182. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972).
183. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974).
184. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958).
185. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943).
186. Douglas Oil Co. of California v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218
(1979).
187. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
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specified. . . .The seal of secrecy on witnesses would be an unnec-
essary hardship, and might lead to injustice if the witness were not
permitted to make a disclosure to his lawyer, his employer, or an
associate. Accordingly no secrecy obligation can be imposed on
grand jury witnesses, although they need not make disclosure if they
do not wish to do so. 188
It might appear at first blush that a bank could disclose to a
customer the fact that a federal grand jury has subpoenaed his
bank records. Indeed, a federal court sitting in California so ruled
in a case involving Crocker National Bank. A federal grand jury
subpoena which the bank received had attached a letter from the
United States Department of Justice directing the bank not to dis-
close the existence of the subpoena duces tecum to the customer
because disclosure would hamper the grand jury's investigation
and interfere with law enforcement. When the bank's attorneys
suggested that the directive concerning non-disclosure violated the
law, the government responded with not-so-veiled hints that dis-
closure by the bank would be considered a violation of the federal
statutes concerning obstruction of justice.
Crocker National Bank then filed a motion in federal court
concerning the non-disclosure condition. After reviewing Rule
6(e)(2), the court concluded that the government's position was
unlawful. The court said simply: "The government therefore can-
not legally impose an obligation of secrecy upon Crocker with re-
spect to this subpoena duces tecum."'189
In 1981, Chief Judge Winner of the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado dealt with a case involving a
motion by two Colorado banks to quash federal grand jury sub-
poenas commanding production of customer records. A unique
feature of the case was that an Assistant United States Attorney
had publicly threatened Colorado bankers with prosecution for ob-
struction of justice for disclosing to bank customers the existence
of subpoenas duces tecum from a federal grand jury.
Chief Judge Winner, in a written opinion, delivered a wither-
ing attack on the United States Attorney's Office. Although he
declined to quash the subpoenas, he specifically ruled that, under
Rule 6(e), the government could not impose a non-disclosure re-
quirement on banks.' 9" Acknowledging the Colorado Supreme
188. 1 C. WRIGHT. supra note 181, at 246-47.
189. In re Vescovo Special Grand Jury, 473 F. Supp. 1335, 1336 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
190. In re. Grand Jury Subpoena, 517 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 (D. Colo. 1981).
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Court's ruling in Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 9 he pointed out that
failure by the banks to make disclosure to the customer could lead
to a lawsuit against them in state court for violating protected
privacy rights. The decision on notification thus belonged to the
banks. Chief Judge Winner concluded: "If a bank notifies a cus-
tomer, no sustainable prosecution for obstructing justice can
follow." 192
These rulings from California and Colorado indicate that dis-
closure to the customer by banks is lawful, the threats by prosecu-
tors notwithstanding. As one authority has written: "Such threats
by the prosecutor are illegal."' 93
Regrettably, the analysis of the disclosure issue does not end
here. Recent developments in the law have reinforced grand jury
secrecy requirements and have given prosecutors a legal basis to
direct that a bank not inform its customer that a federal grand
jury has subpoenaed his bank records. In a leading case, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit seemed to
broaden the grand jury secrecy provisions. The case arose out of a
federal grand jury investigation of Georgia banker Bert Lance. In
an opinion written by United States Circuit Judge (now Chief
Judge) Charles Clark of Mississippi, the Fifth Circuit said:
Courts have interpreted the secrecy requirement imposed by Rule
6(e) to apply not only to information drawn from transcripts of
grand jury proceedings, but also to anything which 'may tend to re-
veal what transpired before the grand jury.' . . . We construe the
secrecy provisions of Rule 6(e) to apply not only to disclosures of
events which have already occurred before the grand jury, such as a
witness's testimony, but also to disclosures of matters which will oc-
cur, such as statements which reveal the identity of persons who will
be called to testify or which report when the grand jury will return
an indictment.' 4
Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has ruled that certain subpoenaed documents were subject
to the secrecy requirements of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 95
Of even greater significance is the fact that on April 28,
191. 612 P.2d 1117 (Colo. 1982).
192. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 517 F. Supp. 1061, 1067 (D. Colo. 1981).
193. NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, REPRESENTATION OF WITNESSES BEFORE FEDERAL
GRAND JURIES § 7.4(b), at 139 (2d ed. 1982).
194. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 610 F.2d 202, 216-17 (5th Cir. 1980).
195. In re Special February, 1975 Grand Jury, 662 F.2d 1232 (7th Cir. 1981).
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1983, the United States Supreme Court issued an order amending
Rule 6(e) by inserting a new Rule 6(e)(6). The new provision,
which became effective on August 1, 1983, reads as follows:
(6) Sealed records. Records, orders and subpoenas relating to grand
jury proceedings shall be kept under seal to the extent and for such
time as is necessary to prevent disclosure of matters occurring before
a grand jury."9 6
The Advisory Committee Note accompanying Rule 6(e)(6)
explained that the new language was needed to insure grand jury
secrecy, particularly in regard to targets of investigation:
Subdivision (e)(6) provides that records, orders and subpoenas relat-
ing to grand jury proceedings shall be kept under seal to the extent
and for so long as is necessary to prevent disclosure of matters oc-
curring before a grand jury. By permitting such documents as grand
jury subpoenas and immunity orders to be kept under seal, this pro-
vision addresses a serious problem of grand jury secrecy and ex-
pressly authorizes a procedure now in use in many but not all dis-
tricts. As reported in Comptroller General, More Guidance and
Supervision Needed over Federal Grand Jury Proceedings 10, 14
(Oct. 16, 1980):
'In 262 cases, documents presented at open preindictment proceed-
ings and filed in public files revealed details of grand jury investiga-
tions. These documents are, of course, available to anyone who
wants them, including targets of investigations. [There are] two doc-
uments commonly found in public files which usually reveal the
identities of witnesses and targets. The first document is a Depart-
ment of Justice authorization to a U.S. attorney to apply to the
court for a grant of immunity for a witness. The second document is
the court's order granting the witness immunity from prosecution
and compelling him to testify and produce requested
information ...
'Subpoenas are the fundamental documents used during a grand
jury's investigation because through subpoenas, grand juries can re-
quire witnesses to testify and produce documentary evidence for
their consideration. Subpoenas can identify witnesses, potential
targets, and the nature of an investigation. Rule 6(e) does not pro-
vide specific guidance on whether a grand jury's subpoena should be
kept secret. Additionally, case law has not consistently stated
whether the subpoenas are protected by Rule 6(e).
'District courts still have different opinions about whether grand
jury subpoenas should be kept secret. Out of 40 Federal District
196. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(6) (1983 amend.), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 245, 250
(1983). For a discussion of the new provision, see Rothstein, Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 69 A.B.A. J. 1838, 1839 (1983).
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Courts we contacted, 36 consider these documents to be secret.
However, 4 districts do make them available to the public.
1 97
It thus appears that the new Rule 6(e)(6) has undermined
the holdings in the grand jury cases arising from California198 and
Colorado. 199 Prosecutors can now insist that a bank not notify its
customer of a grand jury subpoena duces tecum for his bank
records.
Banks, at least those located in Mississippi, should not be
concerned that non-disclosure of the existence of a federal grand
jury subpoena duces tecum will make banks liable to customers.
Neither a Mississippi statute nor a Mississippi judicial precedent
requires disclosure of a subpoena duces tecum to a bank customer.
Even if such a requirement existed under state law, that require-
ment could not stand in federal court against a contrary Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, a bank customer has no
federal right to require notification from a bank. After all, as the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained
prior to the adoption of the new Rule 6(e)(6):
While witnesses who appear and testify before a grand jury may
wish to communicate the fact of their appearance and their testi-
mony to the person who is the subject of the investigation, such com-
munication is entirely optional with the witness. The person who is
the subject of the investigation has no right to require a witness to
divulge such information.2"'
The same point was made even more forcefully in an opinion
rendered in legal proceedings arising out of the issuance of a sub-
poena duces tecum by a federal grand jury sitting in Pennsylva-
nia. The grand jury subpoenaed certain financial records from a
savings and loan association. The savings and loan association
filed a motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum on the ground
that state law did not authorize a savings and loan association to
disclose such information to a grand jury and on the further
ground that disclosure could subject the savings and loan associa-
tion to civil liability. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the motion. The court
197. Advisory Committee Note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 276-77 (1983).
198. In re Vescovo Special Grand Jury, 473 F. Supp. 1335, 1336 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
199. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 517 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 (D. Colo. 1981).
200. In re Swearingen Aviation Corp., 605 F.2d 125, 127 (4th Cir. 1979) (emphasis
added).
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said:
We reject at the outset any suggestion of a banker-depositor privi-
lege which would prevent the Government from obtaining or using
information against a depositor obtained from the bank without the
depositor's permission. Federal courts do not recognize any such
privilege . ..
• . . The fact that this information was revealed to Home Unity
[Savings and Loan Association] by the depositors on the assumption
that it would be used only for a limited purpose and that its disclos-
ure, without consent, was restricted does not, under these circum-
stances, create a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest. Thus, as
we stated earlier, the Government had no obligation to provide no-
tice of the subpoena to the depositors ...
. . . Assuming that a civil action would lie against Home Unity
. . . we think the risk of civil damages is slight and speculative. The
chance that the depositors will suffer compensable damages by a dis-
closure to the federal grand jury, whose proceedings are kept secret,
is quite remote. Moreover, we believe that Home Unity would have
a valid defense, if it is sued, that disclosure was involuntary and due
to compulsion by a federal court.201
A bank would thus be well advised not to disclose to its cus-
tomer the fact that his bank records have been subpoenaed by a
federal grand jury. The legal risks of non-disclosure are virtually
non-existent. The legal risks of disclosure, especially in light of the
new Rule 6(e)(6), are considerable. Moreover, the notice require-
ments of the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 do not apply
to federal grand jury proceedings. 2
If a bank's relationship with a customer is such that it feels it
must make an effort to inform him that a federal grand jury has
subpoenaed his bank records, then the bank should file a motion
with the federal district court seeking court authorization to dis-
close. Even if the motion is denied and federal prosecutors subse-
quently enter the subpoenaed records in evidence against the cus-
tomer, the bank can still tell the customer that it tried to give him
notice but was prevented by court order from doing so.
The bottom line in regard to grand jury subpoenas for bank
records-be the grand jury state or federal-is simply this: Do not
notify the customer unless a court order specifically authorizes
such notification.
201. United States v. Grand Jury Investigation, 417 F. Supp. 389, 391-93 (E.D. Pa.
1976); but see Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1290 (Pa. 1979).
202. 12 U.S.C. § 3413(i) (Supp. 11 1978).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing analysis has shown, it is not a simple matter
for banks to honor a subpoena duces tecum or other compulsory
process requiring production of a customer's bank records and at
the same time avoid potential liability to the customer for breach
of the duty of confidentiality or for violation of his privacy rights.
Bank officers and bank counsel placed in this dilemma should not
respond to a subpoena in a casual or cavalier fashion. Every sub-
poena for bank records is a potential bombshell that could explode
in the corporate face of the bank or the individual face of the
bank officer responsible for responding to the subpoena. Depend-
ing upon the source or nature of the subpoena duces tecum or
other compulsory process, variations in the manner or method of
response may be required.
A comprehensive statute on the confidentiality of bank
records setting forth a bank's duties and responsibilities in regard
to response to compulsory process and in regard to disclosure or
non-disclosure would be a helpful guide in Mississippi. Other
states have enacted such a statute. But until such time as the Mis-
sissippi Legislature bestirs itself in this area, Mississippi banks,
their officers, and bank counsel may find the following statements
and suggestions to be a helpful guide.
(1) According to the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Miller 20 3 a customer's bank records are
not his private papers but rather business records of the bank. The
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure found in the
fourth amendment does not give a customer any such expectation
of privacy in his bank records as to defeat a subpoena duces te-
cum or other legal process.
(2) While the Supreme Court of Mississippi has recognized a
right of privacy, it is not a right set forth in the state constitution
or, for that matter, a right expressly articulated in a state statute.
Nothing in Mississippi law prevents a customer's bank records
from being delivered to another party in response to proper legal
process.
(3) There is an implied common law duty arising out of the
bank-customer relationship that the bank will not disclose the
financial affairs of a customer to a third party except in response
to compulsory process. Section 81-5-55 of the Mississippi Code,
203. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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poorly written though it is, creates a statutory duty of non-disclos-
ure "except when required to be done in legal proceedings . .. ."
Violation of the statute is a criminal offense as well as the basis
for civil liability." 4
(4) There is no legal requirement in Mississippi, as there is in
California by court decision2"" and in other states by statute20 6
that a bank give a customer notice that his bank records are being
sought by subpoena duces tecum or that the bank is going to
honor that compulsory process.
(5) Except in regard to grand jury subpoenas, it is a good
business practice to notify a bank customer that his bank records
have been subpoenaed.
(6) A bank should not disclose to a customer that his bank
records have been subpoenaed by either a federal or state grand
jury. Disclosure could lead to a citation for contempt for revealing
the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.
(7) In the absence of a subpoena duces tecum or other com-
pulsory legal process issued in a court proceeding, or in the ab-
sence of a compliance certificate from an agency of the federal
government, a bank should never disclose customer records to a
requesting party, even if that party is a police officer, district at-
torney, or other person clothed with some official authority.
(8) Because a subpoena duces tecum issued by an executive
officer or administrative agency of the state government may not
be one issued in a legal proceeding within the meaning of Section
81-5-55 of the Mississippi Code, prudence requires that a bank
insist upon a court order before it responds to such an executive or
administrative subpoena.
(9) Before responding to an administrative subpoena issued
by the Internal Revenue Service, a bank should be certain that the
IRS has provided it with the statutory certificate upon which the
bank may rely in good faith and thus avoid possible liability to the
customer.2 o7
(10) Before delivering customer records to any other federal
agency, officer, or employee, a bank should be certain that the
government has provided it with a copy of the compliance certifi-
204. MISS. CODE ANN. § 81-5-55 (1972).
205. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125
Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975).
206. See supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
207. See 26 U.S.C. § 7609(i)(2)-(3) (1982).
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cate mandated by the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978.08
(11) If a bank is ever uncertain about whether it should com-
ply with a subpoena duces tecum for bank records, if a bank
seems to be caught between conflicting legal duties in regard to
such a subpoena, or if a bank wishes for business and customer
relations reasons to disclose to a customer the fact that his records
are being subpoenaed by a federal or state grand jury, then the
bank should file with an appropriate court a motion seeking a pro-
tective order or other relief.
(12) A bank should be certain that the cost of complying
with a subpoena duces tecum for bank records is borne by the
party seeking discovery. Congress has directed that the Internal
Revenue Service 20 9 and other federal agencies21° pay the cost of
search for, and reproduction of, bank records. If another party in
a civil proceeding will not pay this cost in advance, or at least
agree to pay, then the bank should seek a protective order from
the appropriate court.2
Careful attention to the foregoing statements and suggestions
should enable Mississippi banks to resolve the potentially conflict-
ing duties of complying with legal process and protecting confi-
dentiality of customer records. Following these guidelines should
help Mississippi banks to avoid either civil or criminal liability in
regard to customer records.
208. See 12 U.S.C. § 3403(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
209. 26 U.S.C. § 7610 (1982).
210. 12 U.S.C. § 3415 (Supp. 11 1978).
211. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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AUTHOR'S ADDENDUM
As the foregoing article was going to press, the Mississippi
Legislature passed two bills which affect the disclosure of bank
records.
On April 10, 1984, the Governor of Mississippi signed into
law House Bill No. 351, which will henceforth be identified as
Chapter 327 of the General Laws of 1984. This act amended Sec-
tion 81-5-55 of the Mississippi Code so as to permit Mississippi
banks "to report to approved parties, such as credit bureaus, ac-
count verification services and others, the forcible closure of a de-
posit account due to misuse, such as fraud, kiting, or chronic bad
check writing." The Act charged the Commissioner of Banking
and Consumer Finance with determining whether a credit bureau,
account verification service, or similar entity will be placed on the
approved list to receive bank reports that accounts have been
closed because of customer misuse.
From the perspective of Mississippi banks, this Act represents
progress. However, Section 81-5-55 needs further modification
before it becomes a modern statute that fully addresses the issue
of preserving confidentiality of bank records in the contemporary
banking environment.
On April 18, 1984, the Governor signed into law House Bill
No. 448, which will henceforth be identified as Chapter 383 of the
General Laws of 1984. This Act established a procedure for pro-
ducing bank records in court proceedings similar to that procedure
already established for the production of hospital records.212 Space
does not permit a full analysis of the new Act. However, when a
subpoena duces tecum or order is issued in a state court proceed-
ing requiring a bank to assemble or provide the financial records
of a customer, the party requesting the subpoena or order is re-
quired to pay to the court "all reasonable charges of the bank in
searching for, reproducing and transporting the records." Payment
is to be made to the court promptly after delivery of the records to
the requesting party. The charges are to be taxed as costs of court
and are to be paid to the bank not later than final determination
of the litigation by the court in which the suit is filed.
The Act further provided that, unless the production of origi-
nal records is specifically required, the bank may comply with the
subpoena duces tecum or court order by producing copies of the
212. See MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-9-101 through -119 (1972).
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records sought. Moreover, unless the attendance of the bank
records custodian is expressly required, the custodian does not
have to appear personally with the records. He may send an affi-
davit certifying as to the authenticity of the records. The Act fur-
ther specified a detailed procedure for assembling, sealing, and ad-
dressing the subpoenaed bank records.
Mississippi banks will welcome the passage of this legislation.
For the first time, Mississippi banks will have a statutory basis to
assure that they are reimbursed for the costs of producing cus-
tomer financial records in state court proceedings.
The effective date of both Chapter 327 and Chapter 383 of
the General Laws of 1984 is July 1, 1984.
